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1. JURISDIC TIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78A-4-103(2)(h) in that this 
appeal arises from the final judgment of the District Court, the Honorable Stephen L. 
Henriod presiding, which involved a domestic relations matter modifying a previously 
entered Divorce Decree. 
2. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE # 1: Did the District Court err in imputing income to Petitioner? 
Sub-Issues: 
1.1 Did the District Court err in imputing income when there was no 
claim for imputation of income in the Petition to Modify? [Issue preserved: Vol. II, 39/3 -
41/20; 75/13-181; 98/4-22; 104/22 - 106/6; see, also, Petition to Modify] 
1.2 Did the District Court err in imputing income when the issue of 
imputation of income was presented and referred to by Respondent for the first time during 
trial? [Issue preserved: Vol. II, 39/3 - 41/20] 
1.3 Did the District Court allow Respondent to engage in "trial by 
ambush?" [Issue preserved: Vol. II, 39/3 - 4041/20] 
1.4 Did the District Court err in imputing income when it refused to 
allow Petitioner to present rebuttal and/or impeachment evidence to the claim for imputation 
of income when the first time that imputation was raised was at trial? [Issue preserved: Vol. 
11,39/3-41/20] 
1.5 Did the District Court err in holding that the rule of law is that 
Petitioner "can choose to change his employment and his income, but he can't do that to the 
detriment of his children?" [Issued preserved: holding by court not consistent with law] 
1
 ##/## refers to page/line numbers from the Transcript of Bench Trial. Trial 
occurred on February 4, 2009, which is Vol. I and February 11, 2009, which is Vol. II 
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ISSUE # 1 DETERMINATIVE LAW: Utah Code Ann. 78B-12-203. Hall v. Hall, 
858 1 \2d 1018 ( I Jtah App. 1993), 
ISSUE # 1 STANDARD OF REVIEW: "In order to evaluate the merit of appellant's 
fiN inipukition argunieni ^»i mm\ ilHenmiiie whelhcr the trial *\ ../: - jeeiv'r** ::% :::."j!e 
income was supported by adeq uate findings in light of I Jtah C^J. -V:: . •; cx - „i 
(!992). which reads: "Income max IV,I he !mpu:edto a parent unless the parent stipulates to 
unemployed or underemployed.' (fn6) While we agree with appellee that see;:^.. :* a j does 
not specifically require a trial court, in making a "finding" of underemploymcni. o parrot the 
exact language of the statute, it is w ell established tl lat ' v here a statute exp: *-- *. - i 
trial court to make a threshold finding before taking specified judicial action, the trial court 
abuses its discretion t proceeds without first making the legislatively mandated 
finding." [Emphasis addeaj ..>;: ^ . ~ ..::.-._.. -w:). 
"Trial courts have considerable u^crei:on ;:i determining a spoused income, and 
determinations of income will be upheld on appeal absent an abu.se of discretion." Leppert 
v. Leppert, 2009 I I I App 1 3. j > 3 (Ct. i lpj:h I Jtah, J anuary 15, 21309). 
ISSUE ^ •* • -^ V *" . . . v , - ; _ _ r V ^nor tec bv 
suiiicieivte\luCiiccaiiuauvx:uaie itnaingsV si^ c^*cpre^ Ci"\ecI; * • :^  ' - „» r* . v ; 
98/4-22: H>4 2? - i()frb\ 
— • - TRMINATIVini! \V '• / ]tnh ( n<U> \m\ 7XR-P-?in Uollv Hull, 
858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993). 
ISSUE * 2 STANDARD OF REVIEW A e .c\ie\\in- a r>e: eh K : Mr 
si ifficiency r - - - - v - - • ^ ' . - e 
2
 ##/## refers to page/line numbers from the Transcript of Bench Trial, i r-a! 
occurred on February 4,, 2009, which is Vol. I and February I .'. 2009, n hich > V-M \: 
. 3 . 
clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.' State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106,-^ f 10, 
999 P.2d 1252 (quotations and citation omitted)." State v. Nichols, 76 P.3d 1174,1178 (Utah 
App. 2003). [Emphasis added] 
3. STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. 78B-12-203. Determination of gross income — Imputed income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes prospective income from any 
source, including earned and nonearned income sources which may include salaries, 
wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, 
severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous marriages, 
annuities, capital gains, Social Security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, 
unemployment compensation, income replacement disability insurance benefits, and 
payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 
40-hour job. If and only if during the time prior to the original support order, the parent 
normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at the parent's job, the court may 
consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent's ability to provide child 
support. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 3 5 A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family Employment 
Program; 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership 
Act, Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, Food 
Stamps, or General Assistance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
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(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be 
calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business 
operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or 
operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross 
income available to the parent to satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses 
necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from 
gross receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of 
business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and 
then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide 
year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at 
least the most recent year unless the court finds the verification is not reasonably 
available. Verification of income from records maintained by the Department of 
Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income 
tax returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an 
underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the 
amount imputed, the parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and the 
judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative 
proceeding enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived from employment opportunities, work history, 
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occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in 
the community, or the median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same 
geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown, income 
shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To 
impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an 
administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis 
for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the 
condition is not of a temporary nature: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or equal 
the amount of income the custodial parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; 
or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's 
presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the subject 
of a child support award nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own right such as 
Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be 
credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting 
the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a 
child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each 
case. 
- 8 -
Renumbered and Amended "b Chapter 3. 2008 General Session [Emphasis added] 
.^ lAf£MENTOFCASE 
Petitioner and Respondent were divorced and a Decree of Divorce was entered on or 
aboi it September 22 2003, I he Decree awarded both parties the Joint Legal and Physical 
Custody of their three children. On ,/L>~u.< 6, 200' / , Respondent filed her Verified Petition 
to Modify Divorce Decree [Addendum i \. wherein she essentially sought to have the custody 
Order changed an: id also prayed f< " " )nce the custody a ward is modified, the child 
support award should also be modiiicu 10 comport w ith the custody situation.55 
Petitioner Answered and the case ultimately proceeded to Trial on February 4 arid 11, 
Modify wherein the court modified custody from Joint Physical and Joint Legal and awarded 
Respondent, i.'.vneih: .,.*;. .--i.e.:, s,oie Pmsieai M\C: S^.J I ogai Cu^iod}. 
paymen; nc "modirleu lo comport with the eusioa> situation."" ihe irkA eouri disregarded 
Petitioner's current income ih?,i hev asearr.ingand ima. :ed Peiiiioner\-ubsiar:iial!\ higher 
income that he was earning at I: lis forii lei job that he quit approximately 2 years earliei 
In its Memorandum Decision [Addendum. 2] and in justification of its decision to 
impute V..:r-:rv- {~.c -ria! ,w.r: stated: "Mr. Fuell can choose to change his employment and 
his IiiCGi'iiC, out he can't do that to the detriment of his children, w hieh i>, w hat lie has done.* 
[Addendum 2, p. 6]. In doing so, the trial court erred in not following the dictates of the law 
and those requirements set forth in I Hah Code Ann, 78B-12-203. Further, other than the 
evidence offered by Petitioner; there was not one iota of evidence offered by Respondei it that 
Petitioner was voluntarily underemployed or that he quit his job to cause a detriment to his 
children 
9 
Petitioner/Appellant contends that the trial court erred in imputing income at his 
former job's earnings and his appeal is limited to whether the trial court appropriately 
imputed income. 
5. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During trial and for the first time, Respondent made allegations that income should 
be imputed to Petitioner for purposes of re-calculating child support. [Vol. I, Respondent's 
Opening Statement: 11/6-10]. The claim that income should be imputed or that Petitioner was 
wilfully under-employed was never contended by Respondent or raised by Respondent 
during the pendency of the action and was raised for the first time during trial. Even though 
Petitioner vehemently objected, the claim was allowed. Although Petitioner attempted to 
produce contradicting evidence and impeachment evidence, the trial court disallowed the 
evidence to be admitted. Petitioner claimed "trial by ambush," but the trial court allowed 
Respondent's attorney to proceed to argue that income should be imputed. As will be more 
fully discussed below, Respondent's attorney presented absolutely no evidence that Petitioner 
was voluntarily underemployed, but only argued this in his Opening and Closing Statements 
and argued with Petitioner in an attempt to impeach Petitioner. Respondent herself didn't 
even testify or allude to this contention that Petitioner was voluntarily underemployed. 
MR. JOLLEY: Exhibit 8,1 have next. 
MR. BUHLER: Ed object to this whole thing, Your 
Honor. It's not been produced to me before this moment. It's not 
in keeping with the motion in limine. It's not in keeping with the 
order of the first day of this trial. 
MR. JOLLEY: This is true, Your Honor. It's offered -
number one, to support his testimony; number two, as a rebuttal 
by the contention that they've made here by offering a child 
support obligation worksheet based on an old job rather than his 
-10-
c '
kv v ; :^orh^':vv.. .A : ... jontention that 
h^ - wiiiiuw} „nuerempio\ ec ».^. ,:*.. /. .^,.- ./::,.- I hat 
contention was not made at any time during the litigation 
except dui ing tit ial. 
THE COURT: I don't believe it's absolutely implicit in 
the petition to modif\. . :X .-njucaon is sustained based on the 
01 dei* on the mo: . . 
MR. JOLLEY: If I could just have a clarification, Your 
Honor: V on re saying it's to be implied from the -
1: \i v .,. x "• ci modify -
MR. JOLLEY: Petition to modify. I was just going to 
check it. I don't think i don't know if I could be wrong 
about allegation of being underemployed. 
THE COURT: Let's see it. 
MR. J w ^ h Y .-. - * \Yr •---. 
Hii ( Ys- TH ' ••.-:. think you're right There isn't 
anything about his income. There's an allegation that he's had 
ii lcreases since the time of the div orce ' I hat's all 
MR. Bl IHLERi Well, I renew nvy objection on the basis 
of the motion in limine. 
IflFCOUR] i iV -" s int. 
MR. BUHLER: Okay. I don't know what we're talking 
about then. 
. 11 . 
THE COURT: The exhibit's out because Mr. Fuell didn't 
produce anything significant pursuant to the discovery requests 
and there was a motion and I made an order and nothing's 
coming in that controverts that order. 
MR. JOLLEY: But I'm controverting evidence that 
he's produced here at trial that wasn't produced to us prior. 
It's like Mr. Buhler said last time, "It's trial by ambush." 
There's - we had - we weren't requested to produce medical 
records. We had no - or anything dealing with a contention 
that he was willfully underemployed and then they come 
into trial and make that allegation. We had no knowledge of 
anything until the allegation was made here at trial. And all 
I'm doing is rebutting the allegation that comes in at the last 
minute that's not contained in the petition and it wasn't part of 
this case. 
THE COURT: The interrogatory request for production 
of documents requested everything that he had to support his 
financial situation. 
MR. JOLLEY: Well, this -
THE COURT: Job change; this is certainly part of that 
package. 
MR. JOLLEY: I don't know how anybody, especially 
- except in retrospect - you could understand that medical 
-12-
records had to li :] with financial records because at some 
time in the future they would make an allegation of 
underemployment That's all I'm saying is that we didn't find 
this out until then and this supports his testimony. 
MR. B'l II II ER: But, foundational^ , I want to talk to this 
doctor. I want to know what those said. And I w ant to know" how 
things happened 11 la - e not been gi\ en tl lat opporti inity So as 
a matter of foundation - even without the motion in limine. 
THE COURT: They are also excluded as hearsay. [Emphasis added] 
Petitioner explained that due to the fact that his current job would end ir. 20!1. that 
he was advised to seek different employment by his doctors due to stress and \hn\ lie 
completed an educational program, to become a I I \ * VC technician at his own expei ise 
Q. Okay. What was the reason for changing jobs? 
A Se\ eral reasons, One, the place was going to be 
closing, I think, ^ hen I w as there it - "2011 1 
think, is when they planned on a closure dale and when the 
chemical weapons would be burned. And the other thing is I got 
tired of not sleeping. I "d like sleep four hours in a week w hen I 
had to go to work and the job was just too stressful. So, I'd went 
to school and finished school in 2005, gradi lated and got a 
diploma in 2005, and 1 thought that it would be a good time to 
change fields instead of looking for w ork with 1,200 other 
_ 13 . 
people when it comes time for everybody to be laid off out there. 
Q. Okay. And what kind of job did you do for that 
company? 
A. I worked in between the engineers and maintenance 
planners and just helped them find -
Q. Okay. And you say they provided services of 
disposing of chemical weapons? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. And were you experiencing - were any - you 
indicated you couldn't sleep or you were losing sleep because of 
the job. What did you say about that? 
A. Well, I just - 1 knew it was coming to an end. I started 
to hate going to the job. I just didn't even want to be there. So 
I'd went to the doctor to find out if it was just something with 
me, why I wasn't sleeping and stuff, and they tried to give me -
they wanted to give me sleeping pills and stuff, and I don't take 
any sort of medication at all. And they suggested a life change. 
So that's what I did; changed. 
Vol. II, 37/17-38/25 
Q. So am I correct that you also changed jobs because it was 
recommended by your doctor? 
A. They just recommended a lifestyle change. 
Q. And what were your work hours at your former job? 
-14-
/ I worked shift work, day shifts, and night shifts and 
weekends. 
Q. Oka\ V\ J:V :he\ regular shifts? 
A. Wha 
Q. Did \ wu ,ia\ c ,\\c ^ ame shift, year-in, year-out? 
A No. . c.ianged shifts a few times. 
{ - ? 
A ,; -, i us; ' \ c... •; N ! ast hard to go from,, days to nights, nights 
to days, 12-hour shifts. 
rJ::: s ,. . * * * . . - w . ^ . t 
was like. Tell ::^  ::o.* jong were \ou o:. mc da> sniitv : ..J.I 
when did you switch? How long did you M;.:\ ;M; night shifts? 
TI IEU I I NESS:Inevei vv as -
THE COURT: How many hours did you work on a day 
\\ 1 len > on're on a certain shift? Answer his question. 
TI IE WITNESS ; worked 12-hour days and 12-hour 
nights. It went back and forth -
1 1 IE COI JR I ': If you work days shifts, how many weeks 
were you on the day shift? 
THE WITNESS: Well, I wasn't. It was like four days, 
ai id then I'd get like tw o day s off. 
THE COI IRI :  Like that, or was it that? 
THE WITNESS: It was that. 
THE COURT: Four days on, two days off, and then 
you'd change shifts? 
THE WITNESS: To three nights. 
THE COURT: I don't know what your situation was. 
And based on your answers, I still don't have a clue. That's why 
he's asking you the questions and I'm not really satisfied with 
your answers. 
Please go ahead. 
MR. JOLLEY: Tell me what your shifts were, to the best 
of your recollection. 
A. I worked 14 days a month. I would work four days shifts, and 
then - or I'd work four night shifts; Friday, Saturday, Sunday, 
and a Monday, and then I'd be off Tuesday morning, 
Wednesday and Thursday, and then go back to work Friday day 
shift, Saturday day shift, Sunday day shift, and then I'd have 
Monday off and then I would work Tuesday night, Wednesday 
night and Thursday night and get off Friday morning and have 
Saturday off, Sunday off. And then I would work Monday day 
shift, Tuesday day shift, Wednesday day shift and Thursday day 
shift, and then we'd have a seven day break before I went back 
to my four night shifts. 
MR. JOLLEY: Okay. 
-16-
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. That's what I wanted to 
hear. 
Vol. II, 42/5 - 44/12 
MR. BUHLER: So, you're certain that EG&G will close 
in the year 2011? 
A. That was their scheduled closure date when I used to work 
out there. And sometimes it would come a little bit - it was 
never the same. Sometimes it was earlier and sometimes it was 
later. They always - they have a graph of when they start 
burning the chemical weapons. If they have a slowdown, then 
they extend their closure. And if they burn a little faster, then the 
closure date comes earlier. 
Vol. II, 79/3-12 
MR. JOLLEY: Did you change jobs for the purpose of 
avoiding any obligation to your children? 
A. No, I did it for me. For my health. 
Q. Okay. And did you take a pay decrease or increase 
when you changed jobs? 
A. Decrease. 




Q. Was there any overtime involved or extra pay because 
of the way you explained this shift? 
A. Every time we got - yeah, we got paid a night shift 
differential, Sunday premiums, and eight hours of overtime 
every two weeks, so we got 16 hours of overtime a month. 
Q. Now, in your new job, what other than the health 
concerns that you had - were there any other concerns - F m 
sorry, the health and the fact that your job with that company 
would come to an end in 2011, were there any other 
considerations that you thought of in changing to your other job? 
A. I changed jobs - 1 didn't want to wait five years after 
I graduated to look for the employment that I took my school for 
and it had already been three years since I graduated. 
THE COURT: High school graduation (Inaudible) 
graduation? What? 
THE WITNESS: HBAC (sic) technician. 
THE COURT: Where did you go to school? 
THE WITNESS: RSI Phoenix. 
MR. JOLLEY: And are you now working in that field? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you intend to stay in that field? 
-18-
A. Yes, I intend to stay in that field and open my own 
business. 
Vol. II, 44/13-45/23 
Petitioner paid for his education without any assistance from his current employer or 
others, which supports his claims that he undertook this action for the reasons stated by him 
in his testimony, which remained uncontroverted by any evidence presented by Respondent. 
Finally, on the issue of changed jobs: Sir, you said you 
went to school? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Who paid for that? 
A. I did. 
Q. You're sure your company didn't pay for it? 
A. Yep. 
Q. Didn't pay you a nickel? 
A. Not one red cent. 
Q. What? 
A. Not one red cent. It had nothing to do with my field of work, 
and they would not pay for it. 
Q. So, it's just a coincidence that you took it three years ago 
right after you were ordered to start paying child support and we 
filed this petition, it just suddenly occurred to you that at that 
time you needed to go ahead and change and beat the crowd. Is 
that your testimony? 
-19-
. . . . Vol. II, 74/7-25 
Q. Okay, let me put it a different way: Isn't the truth of the 
matter that when you got served with this petition to modify, 
that you quit your job so you wouldn't have to pay the bigger 
child support amount that we were asking for? 
A. No, I quit my job to better myself and for my health. 
Q. It's coincidental that you did it right after, shortly - after we 
filed the petition? 
A. It was probably 9, 10 months after we did the petition. 
Vol.11, 81/1-11 
The only witnesses at Trial were Respondent and Petitioner and even after Petitioner 
explained what is set forth above, Respondent was not re-called and was not asked to 
comment on or discredit anything that Petitioner had testified about concerning Respondent' s 
attorney's contention of voluntary underemployment. 
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred by not only allowing Respondent's attorney to argue a theory of 
underemployment when it was not alleged in the Petition to Modify and was never referenced 
prior to trial, but also erred when it accepted a contention/argument as true when such 
contention was completely unsupported by any evidence. Because the trial court felt that 
Petitioner was not as credible as Respondent, the trial court erred when it shifted the burden 
of proof by requiring Petitioner to essentially disprove Respondent's allegation/contention 
- 2 0 -
at trial concerning voluntary underemployment, rather than require Petitioner to meet her 
burden of proof on the issue of voluntary underemployment with competent evidence. 
The trial court also erred when it did not enter findings of fact as to the evidentiary 
basis for the imputation as required by Utah Code Ann. 78B-12-203(7)(a). 
The trial court's imputation of income because of voluntary underemployment was 
not supported by sufficient evidence and its ruling was clearly erroneous and is against the 
clear weight of the evidence because the only evidence was presented by Petitioner, and 
nothing by Respondent, who only argued voluntary underemployment. Furthermore, none 
of the testimony of Petitioner about why he changed jobs was ever discredited or 
controverted by Respondent. 
7. ARGUMENT 
The only evidentiary basis provided by the trial court in imputing income based on 
voluntary underemployment was that Petitioner changed jobs. [See Memorandum Decision 
(Addendum 2) and Findings of Fact (Addendum 3)]. Because of this overly broad 
interpretation by the trial court of the law, the question arises: When is someone "voluntarily 
underemployed?" The trial court's interpretation that you can change a job but not to the 
detriment of the children seems to imply that taking a job that pays less is always to the 
detriment of the children. This interpretation of the law creates illogical results in endless 
factual scenarios and implies further that the highest amount of income one has been able to 
achieve at any given time in one's life shall establish a threshold income level which will be 
used to determine "underemployment." Taken to illogical extremes, an ex-spouse with high 
income who takes maternity leave should be imputed income at her previous earning capacity 
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even though she may not be able to find equal income after her maternity leave has expired, 
because she "voluntarily" left her job. A person who quits a job in the mines because of 
health or other risk factors must always be imputed with the same level of income. And, 
changing jobs when one knows that his employer will be closing its doors at some point in 
the future will also result in "voluntary underemployment." Even though the trial court 
apparently did not believe Petitioner when he testified that his job at the chemical weapons 
disposal site would be ending in the near future, a cursory search on the internet reveals that 
there just happens to exist a Chemical Weapons' Convention Deadline of 2012 for 
destruction of remaining chemical weapons stockpiles. 
The evidence presented at trial clearly supported that the job change was for the 
benefit of Petitioner's children, to provide for the health of their father and to provide for 
stability in future income production because of job stability. There was no evidence to the 
contrary. Respondent did not testify that she even believed that Petitioner quit his job so he 
could be underemployed and, in fact, she offered absolutely no evidence to support her 
attorney's contention or to discredit or contradict Petitioner's testimony. The only argument 
to support the contention of underemployment was that Petitioner changed jobs during the 
time that the Petition to Modify was pending. 
"Because we are asked to review the results of a bench trial for 
sufficiency of evidence, we will only reverse if the trial court's 
findings were clearly erroneous. 'When reviewing a bench trial 
for sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the trial court's 
judgment unless it is "against the clear weight of the evidence, 
or if [we] otherwise reach[ ] a definite and firm conviction that 
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a mistake has been made.'" State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, f 5, 84 
P.3d 1167 (quoting State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 
(Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987))). 
^ 11 Additionally, 'in those instances in which the trial 
court's findings include inferences drawn from the evidence, we 
will not take issue with those inferences unless the logic upon 
which their extrapolation from the evidence is based is so 
flawed as to render the inference clearly erroneous.' Glew v. 
Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56,«[[ 18, 181 P.3d 791 (citing State 
v.Walker, 743 P.2d at 193)." 
State v. Briggs, 197 P.3d 628, 631 (S. Ct. Utah 2008) 
Regarding the sufficiency and "logic upon which their extrapolation from the 
evidence" would be "so flawed as to render the inference" of voluntary underemployment 
"clearly erroneous," Petitioner's counsel argued in closing: 
He did not - there were no lapse in employment, there 
was no failure to have a job. This was a change of job and I 
think his testimony was credible by going to the doctor, to 
finding out why he couldn't sleep, by having these horrendous 
shifts, that he did this for a good reason, not for the bad reasons 
that they are saying, that is to avoid his obligations to his 
children. 
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I guess if he were informed as a loving dad that they say 
he is and that he really is, that someday if you change this job, 
it will be held against you and the allegation will be made that 
you are going to pay less in child support to hurt your children, 
I believe Mr. Fuell would have remained at the job saying, "No, 
I don't - I'm not going to do something to hurt my children." 
This is something that we as attorneys do in reparation (sic) for 
trial as we look for what we can do. And I think that's all this is 
is they're bootstrapping their way into saying, "Well, we want 
this historic income" when, in fact, he's not making that money. 
He doesn't have a lot of reserves. He's doing what he can. And 
the child support award should be based on his current income, 
which he's been at that job now for some time, since July of 608. 
He has benefits at that job. Now he has insurance for his 
kids, and there was no reason - the reason was never 
contemplated by him that "I'm going to change so that I can 
adjust not only my income down by 29 to 39 to almost 49, I'm 
going to take $2,000 less a month in my pocket so I can avoid 
paying $300 to her." That type - just doesn't make a lot of 
sense. And that's the math if you the two calculators in what 
he's making less by his new job. So it was done for appropriate 
reasons. 
Vol. II, 104/22 - 106/6 
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As stated above, it would make little sense to orchestrate a scheme to pay less in child 
support when the overall effect would be to dramatically reduce the earning spouse's 
disposable income at the same time. Looking at the child support calculators and the incomes 
testified to2, the change of jobs resulted in an decrease in child support to $481.00, but also 
a decrease in income of $2,398. Child support calculated at Petitioner old income of $4,825 
would be $761.00. So, is it logical that someone would intentionally and for the purpose of 
avoiding child support change jobs to save $280 per month in child support payments while 
he would be losing gross income of $2,398 and net income (after deducting child support) 
of $2,118 per month? "Hey, even though I will be losing $2,118 of spendable income to 
myself, I will change jobs so I can deprive my children of $280 per month." The logic of the 
court's statement does not follow the logical inferences that one is compelled to draw from 
the mathematical calculations. 
As such, the only logical inference that could have, and should have, been drawn 
would have been something other than proposed in argument by Respondent's counsel. And, 
the only other evidence which was un-refuted was the testimony of Petitioner about the 
reasons why he changed jobs. 
The trial court also erred when it did not enter findings of fact as to the evidentiary 
basis for the imputation as required by Utah Code Ann. 78B-12-203(7)(a). The Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law state the following with regards to the imputation of income, 
which are also consistent with the Memorandum Decision. 
2
 Petitioner's income: old job: $4,825 and new job: $2,427. Respondent's income: 
$3,000. [See, Memorandum Decision, p. 5] 
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13. Beginning in August 2007 when the petition to modify was 
served upon Mr. Fuell, all of the statutory provisions and 
guidelines for establishing child support shall apply. Ms. Diel's 
income is and was $3,000 per month. 
Mr. Fuell was earning $4,825 per month until mid-2008 when 
he decided he needed a lifestyle change, quit his job, left the 
children uninsured for three months, and took a new job earning 
$2,427.00 per month, and he claims this figure should be used 
for his child support. Mr. Fuell claimed there were medical 
reasons for the job change, but provided no medical evidence, 
brought no witnesses to testify as to any medical condition, 
admitted that he refused to take medication for sleep issue he 
claimed, and as indicated above, was incredible. Mr. Fuell can 
choose to change his employment and his income, but he can't 
do that to the detriment of his children, which is what he has 
done. The income for calculation of child support for Mr. Fuell 
shall be $4,825.00 per month. 
14. Beginning August 2007, the child support obligation for Ms. 
Diel under UCA 78B-12~301(1) will be $466.64 and for Mr. 
Fuell shall be $761.36 per month. 
15. Because ORS has withheld $135.00 per month from Mr. 
FuelFs income during the period between August 2007 and the 
-26-
end of March 2009, he shall receive credit for these payments 
and judgement shall enter for the difference of $12,527.20. 
It appears that another legally insufficient reason for the imputation is that the trial 
court thought that Petitioner's testimony was "incredible." But, unfortunately, a thorough 
review of the Trial Transcript clearly illustrates that the trial court did not give any credence 
to the testimony of Petitioner. This is also borne out by the tone and tenor of the 
Memorandum Decision. The trial court chose to disbelieve what would otherwise be 
believable, especially when there was no evidence to the contrary. Rational questions arise 
and support the veracity of Petitioner, such as why would someone go to school for a 
different career if he did not intend to change careers in the future and why is it so 
unbelievable that one would do this when he knew that his job would be terminating in the 
future due to a nation-wide and world-wide plan to close chemical weapons disposal sites? 
Why would the court impute income when one is medically advised to change careers? 
Notwithstanding that the trial court refused to believe anything that was testified to 
by Petitioner, what is important is that the trial court failed to comply with its statutory duty 
under Utah Code Ann. 78B-12-203(7)(a) and set forth "the evidentiary basis" for imputing 
income. All the trial court did was say that Petitioner's testimony was not credible, but there 
was no evidence presented other than he changed jobs and this is the only evidence relied 
upon by the trial court, which is insufficient for imputation of income. There was no 
discussion by the trial court as to what evidence led it to conclude that Petitioner voluntarily 
changed jobs to hurt his children or to the intentional detriment of Petitioner's children, as 
implied by the statement that Petitioner "can choose to change his employment and his 
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income, but he can't do that to the detriment of his children." And, this statement by the trial 
court is not consistent with the law. 
"Accordingly, because the evidence in this case is not 'clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of the judgment,' we cannot affirm on the basis of 
undisputed evidence in the record. Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1983)." 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah App. 1993) 
"Findings may not be implied, however, when the 'ambiguity of 
the facts' makes such an assumption unreasonable. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 788. This court recently held that we will not imply any 
missing finding where there is a "matrix of possible factual 
findings" and we cannot ascertain the trial court's actual 
findings. See Adams, 821 P.2d at 6. 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025-1026 (Utah App. 1993) 
Petitioner changed jobs because of medically suggested reasons and because he knew 
his job would be ending. He planned for the change in his life by attending school to educate 
and prepare for the change in jobs while continuing to work for his current employer. The 
job change was necessitated by his health and the ultimate future closure of all chemical 
weapons disposal sites, especially the one that he worked for because his employer had told 
him that they would be closing in 2011. Similarly, as in Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 
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1170 (Utah App. 1996), when good reasons (medical, age, etc.) exist for changes in 
employment, income is not properly imputed. 
". . . the goal of imputing income is to prevent parents from reducing their child 
support or alimony by purposeful unemployment or underemployment." [Emphasis added] 
Griffith v. Griffith 959 P.2d 1015,1018 (Utah App. 1998). The was no purpose or intent by 
Petitioner to become unemployed or underemployed. His goals were long range, 
appropriately motivated and for the purpose of bettering his and his children's situation with 
the goal of having his own business some day. The change was also necessitated by 
Petitioner's health as advised by his doctors. 
It is curious that the trial court would criticize Petitioner for not bringing to trial 
supporting evidence or witnesses regarding his medical condition and other factors that 
necessitated the change in employment when the trial court refused to allow medical 
documentation that Petitioner tried to admit and when Petitioner never even knew that a 
claim of underemployment would be made until the day of trial during Respondent's 
Opening Statement. 
"Who knows what evidence a party might produce if given the 
opportunity? In the light of the modern practice under the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, a trial is not to be by ambush. Instead, the 
evidence upon which one relies for judgment can be, and 
should be, known to the opponent: and when all the evidence 
is known, if there is no dispute on any material issue of fact, the 
rules provide that the court may apply the law and thus terminate 
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the matter, thereby conserving the time of the court and avoiding 
expense to the state and 1o the litigants." [Emphasis added] 
Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620, 621-622 (S. Ct. Utah 1974) 
Had Petitioner known Of the claim of voluntary underemployment prior to trial, he 
could have prepared his documentation and witnesses to support his defense to this claim that 
was not even alluded to in the Petition to Modify, as admitted b> the trial court. Petitioner 
was truly blind sided. 
8. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred 
in imputing income to Petitioner in excess of his current earnings and it is requested that this 
portion of the Judgment be set aside and amended to require computation of child support 
using Petitioner's current income. It is fiirther requested that the Judgment also be amended 
to compute the arrearage consistent with Petitioner's current income. 
DATED: October 2, 2009 Respectfully submitted, 
ByT >\AA^^OE\U ^ 
, ' VERNON C. JOLLEY 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant, 
JEFFERY G. FUELL 
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ADDENDUM 
Tabl 
GARY BUHLER (7039)a 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
PO BOX 229 
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029-0229 
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-0354 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JEFFERY G. FUELL 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LORENCITA J. DEL (FUELL) 
Respondent. 
VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY 
DIVORCE DECREE 
Case No. 034300398 DA 
Commissioner Michelle Tack 
Judge Mark S. Kouris 
The petitioner Lorencita Diel, by and through her attorney Gary Buhler, hereby 
petitions the Court to modify the existing decree of divorce as follows: 
1. Lorencita, Jeffery, and the parties' children still live in Tooele County, thus this Court 
has proper jurisdiction over this matter. 
2. Paragraph #3 of the decree awards the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of 
their children Justin, Travis, and Wyatt. 
3. For the first year following the divorce Lorencita and Jeff agreed to have the children 
live with each parent about Vz of the time due to the work schedule Jeff had at his 
employment. 
4. However, Jeff failed to pay any child support or his 14 of the day care as ordered in the 
decree. He did provide the medical insurance coverage for the children through his 
employment. 
1 
5. Beginning in the summer of .2004 Jeff began trying to convince the oldest child to live 
with him full time and the child did choose to stay with his father somewhat more than 
Vz of the time, while the youngerfwo boys stayed almost exclusively with their mother. 
6. From September 2005 through March 2006, the older boy lived full time with his father 
and the middle son stayed with him about four nights per week while the mother, with 
her new husband, were constructing a new house. 
7. Once Lorencita and her husband completed the new home in March 2006, the middle 
son returned 1o living full time with the mother and his younger brother, while the oldest 
continued living with Jeff and visiting Lorencita. 
8. During this time, Travis, the middle son, had several social problems at school which 
resulted in his assignment to the behavior unit of his school. In response to these 
social problems, Lorencita was forced to quit her management job and take other 
employment that paid much less but allowed her to attend to the troubled son 
9. By the end of the 2005 - 2006 school year, Travis had regained control and was out of 
the behavior unit. He started the fall session in regular classes but then without any 
notice or agreement, Jeff removed the child from that school and enrolled him in a 
different school far removed from his mother's home. 
10. Although Travis was then living full time with his father, Jeff failed to control the child or 
make any effort to cooperate with the school authorities and Travis returned to having 
severe problems at school. See attached letter from the school. 
11. In May, 2007 Travis returned 1o living fulltime with Lorencita, her husband and his 
younger brother. 
2 
12. In July 2007, Justin turned 18 years old but did not graduate with his normal class. 
13. Justin is now living on his own and attending adult education while working for 
Lorencita's husband. 
14.These changes in custody from what was expressed in the decree are a substantial 
and material change in circumstance that would allow the court to modify the custody 
award contained within the decree to reflect the conditions actually created by the 
parties whereby the youngest and middle children are living under their mother's 
primary physical custody and the oldest child is living on his own. 
15. Once the custody award is modified, the child support award should also be modified 
to comport with the custody situation. 
16.Lorencita also believes Jeff has received substantial pay increases since the time of 
the divorce that would also allow a modification of the existing child support award. 
17. Lorencita also asks the Court to grant her judgement against Jeff for the $2,600.00 in 
child support he has never paid to her under the terms of the existing decree. 
WHEREFORE Lorencita ask the Court to modify the existing decree to reflect the relief 
requested above. 
DATED this 1st day of August, 07. 
DATED this 1st day of August, 07. 
Gary Buhler 
Attorney for the Respondent 
c*Jkl\il 
rencita Diel 
Lorencita Diel appeared before me at Tooele County, Utah on this 1st day of August, 07 
and proved to me her identity through documentary evidence. After being sworn and 
under oath, signed the preceding document in my presence, and acknowledged and 
affirmed that the information contained in the document was true of her own personal 
knowledge and that she has signed the document voluntarily for its stated purpose. 
r 
JAflME TOPHAM j 
| NOTARY PUBUC - STATE OF UTAH 
531 EAST CLARK STREET 
GRANTSVILLE UT 84029 




92 S Lodestone Way, Tooele, Utah 84074 • 435-833-1900 • FAX 435-833-1912 
June 18,2007 
DearLori 
Thank you for calling and asking for a report on Travis for this past school year. I 
appreciate parents who are actively involved and concerned about their student's 
progress. 
As you know, Travis has presented us with many challenges. We have seen behaviors 
from Travis this year that we have not seen in the past. There are concerns with Travis' 
behavior and attendance. 
Travis was in our behavior classroom last year (2005*2006), and was a model student. 
Travis was often the one that would tell other students to stop being disrespectful and 
disruptive in the classroom and he was a great role model for many of his classmates. At 
the end of the year we decided that Travis was ready to graduate from our program and 
return to mainstream classes when school started for the 2006 / 2007 school year. Travis 
did start the 2006 /2007 school year in regular education and resource classes. However, 
after approximately one month Travis's behavior had become so disruptive that we felt 
the best placement for Travis was to place him back into our behavior classroom. 
After being placed back into the behavior classroom Travis' disruptive behaviors 
increased rapidly. Travis became verbally and physically aggressive toward staff and 
other students. Some of Travis' aggressive behavior included: threatening to kill staff, 
threatening physical harm to staff, use of offensive language, throwing chair, desks, and 
other objects. Travis would also threaten other student with physical harm and verbal 
assaults. 
During this time we had a difficult, if not impossible, time reaching Jeff to discuss 
Travis' behaviors. I made many attempt to reach Jef£ as did our teacher, therapist and 
Principal. Most of our phone calls and letters went unanswered, and it finally came to the 
point that we would have to contact you in order to make contact with Jeff. I appreciate 
that you always responded to our phone calls in a timely manner. 
As you are aware, Travis became so disruptive that the decision was made to place him 
on home bound services. You had many concerns about this decision and we had many 
of the same concerns. We were concerned that if Travis was placed home bound that he 
would spend the majority of the day unsupervised, which would afford him the 
opportunity to get into trouble at home or in the community. After several discussions 
with you we decided that we would keep him in school, but we would have to isolate him 
from other students. It was approximately April 17,2007 that we placed Travis in a 
classroom by himself and provided one-on-one instruction and supervision. 
Board of Education: Gary R. Gowans, President; Julia Holt, Vice President; 
Debra Chapman, Jeff Hogan, Carol Jensen, Karen Nelson, Kathryn Schmidt. Superintendent Michael G Johnsen 
Tooele County School District 
92 S Lodestone Way, Tooele, Utah 84074 • 435-833-1900 • FAX 435-833-1912 
During this school year Travis has also began to identify himself with the ICP gang. He 
would wear the clothing associated with this gang; he would write gang symbols and 
flash gang signs when in the hall This had become a great concern of mine since this 
gang has a growing presence in Tooele and they are eager and willing to welcome anyone 
into gang. Also, during this time Travis began to verbalize that he had begun smoking 
and drinking on a regular basis. 
Another concern that I have had with Travis this year is his attendance. I looked back to 
his attendance in the 2005-2006 school year and compared it to his attendance this year. 
In the 2005-2006 school year Travis had 3 suspensions and 9 absences. This year he had 
7 suspensions and 34 absences. This was a significant increase in both suspensions and 
absences which causes me concern that Travis has missed so much academic and 
behavior support. 
As we have discussed it will be necessary for us to place Travis in our behavior unit at 
Tooele High School for the coming school year. Travis's behaviors are so disruptive and 
violent that it is impossible for us to consider putting him in regular classes at this time. I 
am confident that Travis would be able to work his way out of the behavior unit if Travis 
would just make up his mind to do so. We have a great teacher in the behavior classroom 
next year that will be more than willing to help Travis with anything he needs, but it will 
also be Travis' responsibility to do what is asked of him. 
I find Travis an affable and charming young man who has a lot of potential. However, 
his behavior is hindering his success at this time. I am hopeful that this coming school 
year we can have better communication and collaboration between parents and school 
staff as I feel that this is crucial in helping Travis be successful. I hope this information 
has been helpful. Please feel free to contact me anytime with questions, concerns, or 
suggestions on strategies concerning Travis. I may be reached at 435-849-1120. 
Sincerely, s^\ 
Jqn Jensen \_y 
BeEavior Specialist 
Tooele County School District 
Board of Education: Gary R. Gowans, President; Julia Holt, Vice President; 
Debra Chapman, Jeff Hogan, Carol Jensen, Karen Nelson, Kathryn Schmidt. Superintendent Michael C Johnsen 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JEFFERY G. FUELL, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, : CASE NO. 034300398 
vs. : 
LORENCITA J. FUELL, nka DIEL, : 
Respondent. : 
This matter was tried to the bench on the 4 th and 11th days of 
February, 2009, on the respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. 
Respondent was represented by Gary Buhler and petitioner was represented 
by Vernon C. Jolley. The Court heard testimony from the petitioner and 
the respondent, received exhibits and heard arguments from counsel, took 
the matter under advisement, and now issues this Memorandum Decision. 
Credibility of Witnesses 
Ms. Diel was well-prepared, knowledgeable, with detail regarding the 
relevant facts, supported her testimony with credible documents, and 
evidenced an excellent grasp of the facts and the ability to remember 
them. Her testimony was reasonable and compelling. The petitioner was 
almost totally without credibility. He failed to answer qacr».:ons 
appropriately on cross-examination and had to be instructed by his 
counsel as to the correct answers regarding many facts. He specifically 
testified that he was ignorant of the terms in his Complaint, he refused 
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to acknowledge that his attorney (who drafted the pleadings in the 
parties' stipulated divorce), represented only him and not both parties. 
He testified he was ignorant as to the terms of the Decree of Divorce, 
specifically including the specific provision that he pay 100% of the 
health insurance premiums for the children. He testified that he was 
ignorant of his children's schedules, and that he was ignorant of how his 
children were doing in school. He was unable to give any intelligible 
testimony regarding expenses that he has incurred for the benefit of the 
children, ocher than admitting that he had failed and refused to pay one-
half of expenses properly documented and provided to him by the 
respondent, and went to great lengths claiming he didn't know why the 16-
year-old, Travis, didn't want to spend time at his home, ultimately 
admitting on cross-examination that Travis hates his girlfriend. The 
petitioner presented a purported schedule of his time with the children, 
which was obviously prepared after the fact, and to support his otherwise 
completely unsupported claims regarding time the children were with him. 
He only provided a photocopy, didn't have any original documents, 
provided other documents supposedly to document payments made to the 
respondent for the benefit of the children, which included purchases for 
tires for his vehicle, and to the extent respondent was able to pay to 
obtain photocopies of checks, was discredited almost entirely as to those 
checks she was able to obtain. He swore he had made payments that he 
later was proven not to have made. He claimed he had never received 
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medical bills and evidence of payments for the children's health care, 
which were later proven to have been provided. In conclusion, the 
petitioner's testimony proved either that he is truly ignorant of almost 
every important detail with respect to custody, the children's situation 
since the divorce, or that he was ignorant in part and lying on the other 
part. 
Substantial and Material Change in Circumstances 
Respondent has the burden of proving there was a substantial and 
material change in circumstances before the Court can modify a divorce 
Decree. This was an unadjudicated divorce. It was obtained by 
stipulation. Petitioner was represented by counsel, respondent was 
unrepresented. Therefore, no finding has ever been made as to the best 
interests of the children. 
With respect to modifications of joint custody, § 30-3-10.4, Utah 
Code Ann., provides: 
(1) On the motion of one or both of the parents, or the 
joint legal custodians if they are not the parents, the court 
may, after a hearing, modify an order that established custody 
if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both 
custodians have materially and substantially changed since the 
entry of the order to be modified; and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the 
order would be an improvement for and in the best interest of 
the child. 
* * * 
(3) The order of joint legal custody may be terminated 
by order of the court if one or both parents file a motion for 
termination and the court determines that the joint legal 
custody order is unworkable or inappropriate under existing 
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circumstances. At the time of entry of an order terminating 
joint legal custody, the court shall enter an order of sole 
legal custody under Section 30-3-10. All related issues, 
including parent-time and child support, shall also be 
determined and ordered by the court. 
The Court finds that the joint custody status in the parties' 
divorce is unworkable and the reasons that it is unworkable include, but 
are not limited to the following: 
1 When petitioner unilaterally took Travis without notice to 
respondent, withdrew him from Clark Junior High and enrolled him in 
Tooele Junior High and kept him through that school year, Travis missed 
approximately 40 days of school, was suspended multiple times and 
ultimately expelled. In April of 2006, after spring break, respondent 
brought Travis back to respondent's home and he went from all uF's" to 
all "C's" and by year-end to all "A's". Petitioner didn't even know 
Travis wasn't doing well in school during that year. 
2 Petitioner has failed to exercise a reasonable amount of 
visitation for an extended period of time, with both minor children 
residing almost exclusively with the respondent for more than the past 
year. 
3 For petitioner's lack of knowing or understanding the 
children's situation and what is going on in their lives as referred to 
above under the heading of "Credibility," cumulatively the total and 
complete failure of the petitioner as a custodial parent amount to a 
substantial and material change of circumstances. 
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Best Interests of the Children 
The status quo for more than a year has been that the children 
reside full-time with their mother and Wyatt spends few overnights with 
his father and Travis spends no overnights with his father. The 
performance of the children in school alone shows that it is in their 
best interest that the respondent be awarded sole custody. 
All of the statutory provisions shall apply with respect to the 
guidelines for establishing child support, the parties will share 
uninsured health expenses equally. At the current time one parent is 
providing medical insurance and the other is providing health insurance, 
and they should share those premiums equally. They should share the cost 
of work-related child care equally, and the advisory guidelines will be 
part of the Order. 
Incomes to Use 
Respondent's income is $3,000 per month. Petitioner was earning 
$4,825 per month until mid-2008 when he decided he needed a lifestyle 
change, quit his job, left the children uninsured for three months, and 
took a new job earning $2,427 per month, and he believes this figure 
should be used for his child support. Respondent's position is that he 
is voluntarily underemployed. Petitioner claimed there were medical 
reasons, but provided no medical evidence, brought no witnesses to 
testify as to any medical condition, admitted that he refused to take 
medication for a sleep issue he claimed, and as indicated above, was 
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incredible. He can choose to change his employment and his income, but 
he can't do that to the detriment of his children, which is what he has 
done. The income for calculation of child support for the petitioner 
shall be $4,825. 
Arrearages 
After a great deal of conflicting evidence about payments regarding 
health care expenses for the children, the parties have agreed that the 
petitioner should owe $23 0 to the respondent for unpaid medical issues. 
He should also reimburse the respondent for the medical insurance 
premiums during 2 00 8 before he became eligible for insurance in his new 
job, and respondent produced persuasive evidence that for a period of 13 
months the petitioner failed to pay the $200 per month in child support 
awarded in the divorce Decree, and she is awarded Judgment in that sum. 
Attorney's Fees 
The record, including the Court's file and the testimony at trial, 
shows that the petitioner has willfully refused to cooperate in the 
discovery process and this has necessitated respondent's counsel taking 
many otherwise unnecessary actions, including a Motion to Compel and a 
Motion in Limine in order to get as much verifiable information from the 
petitioner for use at trial as possible. Th^ petitioner's failure to 
respond in this litigation process mirrors his failures as a parent, and 
he must have been an extremely frustrating client to work with for his 
counsel who, despite hindrances caused by his passive/aggressive and 
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stubborn refusal to participate that made their burden unnecessarily 
difficult to provide proper representation under the circumstances, he 
has done a fine job. Respondent is awarded attorney's fees in an amount 
to cover the additional work that shouldn't have been done because of 
petitioner's failure to provide information, including such simple things 
as a current paycheck. The Court finds that the sum of $1,500 is an 
appropriate sum to cover that additional work. 
Mr. Buhler is to prepare Findings, Conclusions and a Judgment 
consistent with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this ^ ^ day of February, 200>^^^ : v 
STEPHEN L. HENRIODl jf 
DISTRICT COURT JUD&E / 
-A // 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this -^ day of 
February, 2009: 
Vernon C. Jolley 
Attorney for Petitioner 
9710 South 700 East, Suite 205 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Gary A. Buhler 
Attorney for Respondent 
291 N. Race 
Grantsville, Utah 84029 
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GARY BUHLER (7039) FlLE° e ^ 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT "~~"—-^ 
PO BOX 229 
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029-0229 
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-0354 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JEFFERY G. FUELL 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LORENCITA J. DIEL (FUELL) 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CONCERNING PETITION TO 
MODIFY DIVORCE DECREE 
Case No. 034300398 DA 
Commissioner Michelle Tack 
| Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This matter tried to the bench on the 4th and 11th days of February, 2009, on the 
respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. Lorencita Diel (Fuell) was 
represented by Gary Buhler and Jeffery Fuell was represented by Vernon C. Jolley. 
The Court heard testimony from the parties, received exhibits and heard arguments 
from counsel, took the matter under advisement and issued its Memorandum 
Decision on February 27, 2009. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Credibility of Witnesses 
The Court finds that: 
1. Ms. Diel was well-prepared, knowledgeable, and provided detail regarding the 
relevant facts. She supported her testimony with credible documents, and 
evidenced an excellent grasp of the facts and the ability to remember them. Her 
testimony was reasonable and compelling. 
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2. Mr. Fuell was almost totally without credibility. He failed to answer questions 
appropriately on cross-examination and had to be instructed by his counsel as to 
the correct answers regarding many facts. He specifically testified that he was 
ignorant of the terms in his Complaint and he refused to acknowledge that his 
attorney who had drafted the pleadings in the parties' stipulated divorce 
represented only him and not both parties. 
He testified he was ignorant as to the terms of the Decree of Divorce, specifically 
including the specific provision that he pay 100% of the health insurance 
premiums for the children. 
He testified that he was ignorant of his children's schedules, and that he was 
ignorant of how his children were doing in school. 
He was unable to give any intelligible testimony regarding expenses that he has 
incurred for the benefit of the children, other than admitting that he had failed and 
refused to pay one-half of expenses properly documented and provided to him by 
Ms. Diel, and went to great lengths claiming he didn't know why the 16 year-old, 
Travis, didn't want to spend time at his home, ultimately admitting on cross-
examination that Travis hates his girlfriend. 
3. Mr. Fuell only provided a photocopy of a purported historical schedule of his time 
with the children to support his otherwise completely unsupported claims 
regarding time the children were with him. This document was obviously prepared 
after the fact, and he didn't have any original documents. 
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4. Mr. Fueil provided other documents supposedly to document payments he made 
to Ms. Diel for the benefit of the children, which included purchases for tires for his 
vehicle, and to the extent she was able to pay to obtain photocopies of checks, his 
claims were discredited almost entirely as to those checks she was able to obtain. 
On direct. Mr. Fueil swore he had made payments that on cross examination he 
was proven not to have made. 
5. Mr. Fueil claimed he had never received medical bills and evidence of payments 
for the children's health care, which were later proven to have been provided. 
6. In conclusion, Mr. Fuell's testimony proved either that he is truly ignorant of almost 
every important detail with respect to the children's situation since the divorce, or 
that he was ignorant in part and lying on the other part. 
Substantial and Material Change in Circumstances 
7. This was an unadjudicated divorce obtained by stipulation. Mr. Fueil was 
represented by counsel. Ms. Diel was unrepresented. Therefore, no finding has 
ever been made as to the best interests of the children. 
8. Ms. Diel has the burden of proving there was a substantial and material change in 
circumstances before the Court can modify a divorce decree. With respect to 
modifications of joint custody, §30-3-10.4, Utah Code Ann., provides: 
(1) On the motion of one or both of the parents, or the joint legal custodians if 
they are not the parents, the court may, after a hearing, modify an order that 
established custody if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both custodians have materially 
and substantially changed since the entry of the order to be modified; and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the order would be an 
improvement for and in the best interest of the child. 
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(3) The order of joint legal custody may be terminated by order of the court if 
one or both parents file a motion for termination and the court determines that 
the joint legal custody order is unworkable or inappropriate under existing 
circumstances. At the time of entry of an order terminating joint legal custody, 
the court shall enter an order of sole legal custody under Section 30-3-10. Ail 
related issues, including parent-time and child support, shall also be 
determined and ordered by the court. 
9. The Court finds that the joint custody status in the parties' divorce is unworkable 
and the reasons that it is unworkable include, but are not limited to the following: 
A. When Mr. Fuell, without notice to Ms. Diel, unilaterally withdrew the parties' son 
Travis from Clark Junior High and enrolled him in Tooele Junior High and kept 
him through that school year, Travis missed approximately 40 days of school, 
was suspended multiple times and ultimately expelled. 
In April of 2006, after spring break, Ms. Diel brought Travis back to her home 
and he went from all "Fs" to all "C's" and by year-end to ail TVs". Mr. Fuell 
didn't even know Travis wasn't doing well in school during that year. 
B. Mr. Fuell has failed to exercise a reasonable amount of visitation for an 
extended period of time, with both minor children residing almost exclusively 
with Ms. Diel for more than the past year. 
C. For Mr. FuelPs lack of knowing or understanding the children's situation and 
what is going on in their lives as referred to above under the heading of 
"Credibility," cumulatively the total and complete failure of Mr. Fuell as a 
custodial parent amount to a substantial and material change of circumstances. 
Best Interests of the Children 
10.The status quo for more than a year has been that the children reside full-time 
with their mother and Wyatt has spent a few overnights with his father and Travis 
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has spent no overnights with his father. The performance of the children in school 
alone shows that it is in their best interest that Ms. Diei be awarded their sole 
custody. 
11 .At the current time, each of the parents are providing medical insurance for the 
children and they should begin to share those premiums and ail uninsured health 
expenses equally. 
12. If needed, the parents should share the cost of work-related child care equally, 
and the advisory guidelines will be part of the Order. 
Child Support and Incomes to Use 
13. Beginning in August 2007 when the petition to modify was served upon Mr. Fuel!, 
all of the statutory provisions and guidelines for establishing child support shall 
apply. Ms. Diei's income is and was $3,000 per month. 
Mr. Fuell was earning $4,825 per month until mid-2008 when he decided he 
needed a lifestyle change, quit his job, left the children uninsured for three 
months, and took a new job earning $2,427.00 per month, and he claims this 
figure should be used for his child support. Mr. Fuell claimed there were medical 
reasons for the job change, but provided no medical evidence, brought no 
witnesses to testify as to any medical condition, admitted that he refused to take 
medication for a sleep issue he claimed, and as indicated above, was incredible. 
Mr. Fuell can choose to change his employment and his income, but he can't do 
that to the detriment of his children, which is what he has done. The income for 
calculation of child support for Mr. Fuell shall be $4,825.00 per month. 
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14. Beginning August 2007. the child support obligation for Ms. Die! under UCA 78B-
12-301(1) will be $466.64 and for Mr. Fuell shall be $761.36 per month. 
15. Because ORS has withheld $135.00 per month from Mr. FuelPs income during the 
period between August 2007 and the end of March 2009, he shall receive credit for 
these payments and judgement shall enter for the difference of $12,527.20. 
Arrearages 
16. Ms. Diel produced persuasive evidence that for a period of 13 months prior to 
August 2007, Mr. Fuell failed to pay the $200 per month in child support awarded in 
the divorce Decree and she is awarded Judgment in that sum of $2,600.00. 
17. After a great deal of conflicting evidence about payments made regarding health 
care expenses for the children, the parties have agreed that Mr. Fuell should pay 
$230.00 to Ms. Die! for unpaid medical expenses incurred by the children and she is 
awarded Judgment in that sum. 
18. Mr. Fuell is also obligated to reimburse Ms. Diel for the medical insurance 
premiums during 2008 before he became eligible for insurance in his new job in the 
amount of $1,534.89. 
Attorney's Fees 
19.The record, including the Court's file and the testimony at trial, shows that Mr. Fuell 
has willfully refused to cooperate in the discovery process and this has necessitated 
Ms. DiePs counsel taking many otherwise unnecessary actions, including a Motion 
to Compel and a Motion in Limine in order to get as much verifiable information from 
Mr. Fuell for use at trial as possible. 
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20. Mr. Fuell's failure to respond rn this litigation process mirrors his failures as a parent, 
and he must have been an extremely frustrating client to work with for his counsel 
who has done a fine job despite hindrances caused by the client's stubborn 
refusal to participate that made their burden unnecessarily difficult to 
provide proper representation under the circumstances. 
21. Ms. Die! is awarded attorney's fees in an amount to cover the additional work that 
was required solely because of Mr. FuelPs failure to provide information, including 
such simple things as a current paycheck. The Court finds that the sum of $1,500 is 
an appropriate sum to cover that additional work. 
22. Because the child support that has remained unpaid is deemed to be a judgment 
subject to the statutory rate of interest until paid in full, the support judgment is 
hereby augmented by the current judgment rate of 2.4% annua! interest. 
23.The total $18,392.09 judgment shall be additionally augmented by ongoing interest 
at the statutory rate until paid in full and by any and all costs of collection to include 
Ms. Diel's reasonable attorney's fees at the rate normally and reasonably charged 
by her attorney at the time of the collection expenses. 
24. Because this obligation is a family support obligation, it may not be discharged in 
any bankruptcy action unless so ordered by the appropriate bankruptcy court. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, the divorce decree should 
be modified as set forth above and a judgment should enter under the terms stated 
herein. 
Dated this fyfaj d^j , BY THE COURT: r_l _ _ 
Stephen L. Henriod 
Third District Court Judge 
NOTICE OF ORDER 
Dated March 10,2009: 
Utah Attorney General Child Support Vernon Jolly 
PO Box 140851 9710 South 700 East Suite 205 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 Sandy UT 84070 
Pursuant to Rule 7 the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, you are hereby 
notified that the respondent's counsel has forwarded the original hereof to the Court for 
signature, and you have five (5) days from the date this notice is served upon you to file 
any written objections to the form of the foregoing order with the Court and mail a copy to 
respondent's counsel, if no objections are filed within that time, the original hereof will be 
signed and filed. 
Gary Buhler 
Attorney for Lorencita Die! 
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GARY BUHLER (7039) 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
PO BOX 229 
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029-0229 
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-0354 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JEFFERY G. FUELL 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LORENCITA J. DiEL (FUELL) 
Respondent. 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
TO MODIFY DIVORCE DECREE 
Case No. 034300398 DA 
j Commissioner Michelle Tack 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This matter was tried to the bench on the 4th and 11 th days of February, 2009, 
on the respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. The Court having entered 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, hereby enters the following: 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
1. Because the Court has found that the joint custody status in the parties' divorce is 
unworkable and sole custody to the mother is in the best interests of the children, 
the existing decree is so modified and the advisory guidelines under UCA §30-3-
10 shall apply to this Order. 
2. Ms. Diel, having met her burden of proving there was a substantial and material 
change in circumstances pursuant to UCA §30-3-10.4, is hereby awarded the 
primary physical care custody and control of Travis, and Wyatt Fuell. 
3. Mr. Fuell shall have parent time pursuant to UCA 30-3-35. 
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4. Mr. Fuell and Ms. Diel are, at the current time, each providing medical insurance 
for the children and as of March 1, 2009 they shall begin to share those premiums 
and all uninsured health expenses equally. 
5. If needed, the parents shall share the cost of work-related child care equally. 
6. For the purposes of calculating child support, Ms. Diel's income is $3,000 per 
month and Mr. Fuell is deemed to be earning $4,825 per month. Beginning 
August 2007, the base child support obligation for Ms. Diel under UCA 78B-12-
301(1) will be $466.64 and for Mr. Fuell shall be $761.36 per month. 
7. Beginning in August 2007, and continuing until the children attain the age of 18 or 
graduate high school in due course, which ever event last occurs, Mr. Fuell shall 
pay to Ms. Diel $761.36 per month as and for child support. 
8. Because ORS has withheld $135.00 per month from Mr. Fuell's income during the 
period between August 2007 and the end of March 2009, he shall receive credit for 
these payments and judgement shall enter for the difference of $12,527.20 in 
adjusted child support owed to Ms. Diel. 
9. In addition, Mr. Fuell failed to pay Ms. Diel $2,600.00 in child support prior to 
August 2007 and judgement in that amount shall enter for past due child support 
owed to Ms. Diel. 
10. Mr. Fuell shall pay $230.00 to Ms. Diel for unpaid medical expenses incurred by the 
children and she is awarded Judgment in that amount 
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11. Mr. Fuell is also obligated to reimburse Ms. Diel for the medical insurance 
premiums she alone paid during 2008 in the amount of $1,534.89 and she is 
awarded Judgment in that amount. 
12. Ms. Diel is awarded attorney's fees from Mr. Fuell in an amount of $1,500.00 and 
she is awarded Judgment in that amount. 
13.The total $18,392.09 judgment shall be augmented by ongoing interest at the 
statutory rate 2.4% annual interest until paid in full and by any and all costs of 
collection to include Ms. Diel's reasonable attorney's fees at the rate normally and 
reasonably charged by her attorney at the time of the collection expenses. 
14. Because this obligation is a family support obligation, it may not be discharged in 
any bankruptcy action unless so ordered by the appropriate bankruptcy court. 
Dated this fy*t£ fp*! . BY THE COURT: 
Stephen L. Henriod 1 ^  f^jz^fS\ \ 
Third District Court Judae ' x^&&fi. - 1 ir  i tri t rt 4i$g3 
NOTICE OF ORDER 
Dated March 10,2009: 
Utah Attorney General Child Support Vernon Jolly 
PO Box 140851 9710 South 700 East Suite 205 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 Sandy UT 84070 
Pursuant to Rule 7 the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, you are hereby 
notified that the respondent's counsel has forwarded the original hereof to the Court for 
signature, and you have five (5) days from the date this notice is served upon you to file 
any written objections to the form of the foregoing order with the Court and mail a copy 
to respondent's counsel. If no objections are filed within that time, the original hereof 
will be signed and filed. 
Gary Buhler 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the date set forth below, I served a true and accurate copy of 
the document described as APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF on the following named 
persons by depositing said document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed 
as follows: 
GARY BUHLER Two (2) Copies 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 229 
Grantsville, Utah 84029 Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
DATED: AA^L. Jjmi^H— 
